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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of several recent bank collapses following the 2008 global financial crisis, 
insolvency risk, previously understudied, emerges as one of the key risks in the banking 
sector.  Hence, this study aims to fulfill this gap by investigating insolvency risk ( 
measured by Z-SCORE) and its dependency on  asset quality (nonperforming loans 
(NPL), provision for nonperforming loans (PNPL)), income structure (IATA, IITA, 
FBTA), macroeconomic factors (GDP growth, inflation (INF), Interest (INT) and 
Corruption (CUR). Capital regulation (CAR) is incorporated in the research model to 
assess its moderating effect on the relationships between those independent variables 
and insolvency risk. 161 conventional banks and 35 observations from Islamic banks 
of Pakistan were analyzed from 2007 to 2015 period. The data were collected from the 
several sources such as Annual report of banks, Economic Surveys of Pakistan, World 
Bank database and Transparency International reports. Random Effect, Common Effect 
model and Hierarchical Regression were performed to identify the determinants of 
insolvency risk and the moderating effect of CAR on the banks. The results show that 
NPL, IITA, FBTA, GDP, INF and CUR were found significant with insolvency risk in 
conventional banks, while CAR moderated NPL, PNPL and INF with insolvency risk. 
For Islamic banks, GDP was negatively whilst CUR was positively related to 
insolvency risk. Both were significant. In contrast to conventional banks, CAR 
strengthened NPL, PNPL, IATA, IITA and FBTA relationship with the Z-SCORE. The 
findings of CAR effect on the relationship between asset quality, income structure and 
macroeconomic factors with insolvency risk were mixed in conventional and Islamic 
banks of Pakistan. The mixed results imply that policy makers and practitioners should 
develop different prudential regulations and risk management strategies to conventional 
and Islamic banks in order to mitigate insolvency risk, hence increase the sustainable 
growth of Pakistani banks.  
Keywords: bank asset quality, income structure, macroeconomic factors, insolvency 
risk, capital regulations. 
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ABSTRAK 
Ekoran daripada keruntuhan beberapa bank baru-baru ini  kerana krisis kewangan 
global 2008, risiko insolvensi, yang mana tidak banyak di kaji sebelum ini, muncul 
sebagai salah satu risiko utama dalam sektor perbankan. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan 
untuk memenuhi jurang ini dengan menyiasat risiko insolvensi (diukur oleh Z-Score) 
dan pergantungannya kepada kualiti aset (NPL), peruntukan bagi pinjaman tidak 
berbayar (PNPL)), struktur pendapatan (IATA, IITA, FBTA ), faktor-faktor 
makroekonomi (pertumbuhan KDNK, inflasi (INF), faedah (INT) dan Rasuah (CUR). 
Regulasi Modal (CAR) yang terkandung di dalam model kajian adalah untuk menilai 
kesan kesederhanaan terhadap hubungan diantara pembolehubah-pembolehubah bebas 
dan risiko insolvensi. 161 pemerhatian dari bank konvensional dan 35 pemerhatian dari 
bank Islam Pakistan dianalisis daripada tahun 2007-2015. Data  dikumpulkan dari 
beberapa sumber seperti laporan tahunan bank, Penyiasatan Ekonomi Pakistan, 
Pangkalan Data Bank Dunia dan Laporan Transparency International. Kesan Rawak, 
Model Kesan Biasa dan Regresi Hierarkaki telah dijalankan untuk mengenal pasti 
penentu risiko insolvensi dan kesan kesederhanaan CAR. Hasil kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa NPL, IITA, FBTA, KDNK, INF dan CUR adalah signifikan dengan risiko 
insolvensi di bank konvensional, manakala CAR, membei kesan sederhana yang 
signifikan terhadap hubungan di antara NPL, PNPL dan INF dan risiko insolvensi. Bagi 
Perbankan Islam, KDNK adalah negatif manakala CUR berhubung secara positif 
dengan risiko insolvensi. Kedua-duanya adalah signifikan. Berbeza dengan bank 
konvensional, CAR mengukuhkan hubungan NPL, PNPL, IATA, IITA dan FBTA 
dengan Z-skor untuk bank Islam. CAR menunjukkan kesan yang berbeza kepada 
hubungan antara kualiti aset, struktur pendapatan dan faktor-faktor makroekonomi 
dengan risiko insolvensi di antara bank konvensional dan bank Islam. Keputusan yang 
berbeza itu memberi implikasi bahawa pengubal dasar dan pengamal harus 
membangunkan regulasi berhemat dan strategi pengurusan risiko yang berbeza untuk 
mengurangkan risiko insolvensi bank konvensional dan bank Islam di Pakistan.  
Kata kunci: kualiti aset bank, struktur pendapatan, faktor-faktor makroekonomi, 
risiko insolvensi, peraturan modal.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Failure of financial institutions can produce shocks to the economy. This is 
evident from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. A financial crisis imposes 
shocks on major sectors of the economy, which result in reduction in income, uplift of 
currency crises and shrinkage of wealth in the real economy (Levine & Zervos, 1998; 
Hoggarth, Reis, & Saporta, 2002; Čolaković, 2014; Varotto & Zhao, 2014; Ayadi et 
al., 2015). Moreover, there is no standard discrimination for financial crisis between 
developed and developing countries. Both categories of countries have to face boom 
and bust of financial cycles.  For example in the region of European Union countries, 
the average decrease in GDP was 4.3% due to GFC (Karanikolos et al., 2013). 
Similarly, the regions of Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
Countries (OECD) and Central and East European countries (CEE) were badly affected 
by the financial crisis which decreased their economic growth, on average by 3% to 4% 
(Kapp & Vega, 2014; Corovei, 2015; Romer & Romer, 2015). 
Furthermore, financial sector is also committed to the quality of financial 
institutions and its stability is very much dependent on the quality of the institution 
especially in emerging countries like India, China, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and 
Egypt. The quality of the institutions is reflected in its credit rating which is 
significantly affected by asymmetric information and it is more prevalent in developing 
countries such as Pakistan. An institution with a lower credit rating has a lower quality 
of asset as compared to the one with higher credit rating. Therefore, an institution with 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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Appendix – I: List of Commercial banks of Pakistan 
 
SR# List of Banks In Pakistan 
 Public Sector Bank Incorporation Date  
1 First Women Bank 1989  
2 NBP 1949  
3 Bank of Khyber 1991  
4 Bank of Punjab 1989  
  Private Commercial Banks   
1 Allied Bank 1974  
2 Askari Bank 1991  
3 Bank Al Habib 1991  
4 Bank Alfalah 1997  
5 Faisal Bank 1994  
6 Habib Bank 1950  
7 Habib Metro Politan Bank 1992  
8 JS Bank 2006  
9 Mushlim Commvercial Bank 1947  
10 National Investmetn Bank 1993  
11 Samba Bank 2002  
12 Silk Bank 2007  
13 Sonari Bank 1992  
14 Standard Chartered 2006  
15 Summit Bank 2006  
16 UBL 1959  
  Specialized  Banks   
1 
Punjab Provincial Cooperative 
Bank 1976 
 
2 SME Bank. Ltd. 2002  
3 Zarai Taraqiati Bank 1991  
     
 Total Banks 23    
  
No of Observation 
Expected 23 * 9 (2007-2015) 
207 
Source: Quarterly Compendium, Statistics of Banking System by State Bank of Pakistan 
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Appendix – II: List of Islamic bank of Pakistan 
 
SR# 
List of Islamic Banks Incorporation Date 
1 Al Baraka Bank 2007 
2 Dubai Islami  2006 
3 Burj Bank 2007 
4 Bank Islami 2006 
5 Meezan Bank 2002 
 Total Banks 5 
 No of Observations 5*9 (2007-2015) = 45 
Source: Quarterly Compendium, Statistics of Banking System by State Bank of Pakistan 
  
 369 
 
Appendix III: Model Selection Tests (Common, Fixed and Random Effects 
Model) 
 Redundant Fixed Effects Test Results 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests 
  
Pool: Conventional Banks    
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
Cross-section F 2.587611 -22,127 0.0005 
Cross-section 
Chi-square 59.627039 22 0 
 
 Hausman Test to select between Random Effects and Fixed Effects Model 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Pool: Conventional Banks    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
Cross-section random 0 11 1 
     
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero. 
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 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test to determine appropriate 
model between Common Effects and Fixed Effects Model 
Breusch and  Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
Test:   Var(u) = 0    
chibar2(01) =    57.50    
Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000   
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Appendix IV: Inflation Data of India 
Country Year Inflation(%) 
India 
2000 4 
2001 3.7 
2002 4.4 
2003 3.8 
2004 3.8 
2005 4.2 
2006 6.1 
2007 6.4 
2008 8.4 
2009 10.9 
2010 12 
2011 8.9 
2012 9.3 
2013 10.9 
2014 6.4 
2015 5.88 
Average 6.8175 
Source:www.worldbank.org 
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Appendix V: Discussion on Insignificant Hypothesis 
H2a: There is a significant relationship between provision for nonperforming loans/ 
financing to gross loans/ financing and insolvency risk of conventional banks in 
Pakistan. 
The regression result indicates that there is no significant relationship between 
provision for nonperforming loans (PNPL) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) but the 
direction of relationship is negative in conventional banks of Pakistan. One of the 
reasons could be that an increase in provision for nonperforming loans is an indication 
of higher ratio of loan default for the year. However, provision for loan loss is an 
expense item and management prefers not to allocate higher provisions because it will 
lead to lower income. In such strategy the bank management try to reduce volatility in 
the earning and increase the stability and value of the bank (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & 
YANG, 2004). The bank with such strategy is actually allowed by the State bank of 
Pakistan (Syed, 2007; Jameel Ahmed, 2009; Zaman, 2015). Furthermore, it is also 
recognized as discretionary action of management (Liu, Ryan, & Wahlen, 1997; Syed, 
2007; Inayat Hussain et al., 2011; Zaman, 2015).  
Another reason could be that when loan loss provisions are relatively high, there 
are expenses of bad debts, that reduces income before interest and tax which is a part 
of numerator of calculating Z-SCORE. So, because of numerator value of Z-SCORE, 
this will relatively lower the value of Z-SCORE. The lower value of Z-SCORE is an 
indication of a riskier bank. Hence, when the value of Z-SCORE is lower there is an 
incentive to allocate a lower PNPL to improve banks stability (Leventis, Dimitropoulos, 
& Anandarajan, 2011). Therefore, manipulation in provision for nonperforming loans 
creates agency problem in which managers tends to increase personal incentives.  
H3a: There is a significant relationship between income from advances/ financing and 
insolvency risk of conventional banks in Pakistan. 
The regression result of relationship between income from advances (IATA) 
and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) is insignificant which is on contrary to the developed 
hypothesis. The plausible reason for an insignificant result of income from advances 
and insolvency could be due to the increased dependency of government borrowing 
from scheduled banks (EconomicSurvey, 2015, 2016). Another reason could be 
lowered down expenses, low deposits rate, injection of equity, laying off employees, 
overhead costs, management risk aversion and reducing operating expenses. Thus, 
reducing expenses and gaining economy of scale increases income stability of banks or 
in other words it reduces insolvency risk as argued by some previous researcher’s i.e.  
(Hughes and Mester (1998); Azureen, 2012). Similarly Rose and Hudgins (2006) also 
highlighted that reducing expenses and increasing revenue creates gap between 
revenues and expenses, this helps to increase bank income. So, the increase in income 
improves value of Z-SCORE that is an indication of a stable bank. 
According to Lin et al. (2012) and  Zhou (2014), income from advances is less 
sensitive and less volatile if banks have diversified its lending portfolio. Furthermore, 
if a bank is diversified in both traditional and nontraditional line of business it reduces 
the shocks to total income (Odesanmi & Wolfe, 2007). Thus, this can be a reason that 
if bank has diversified its portfolio of lending, it will reduce shock to its earning. In 
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other words, improved earning reduces insolvency risk of a bank. This is also in relation 
theory of modern portfolio that a diversified portfolio reduces risk (Markowitz, 1959; 
Markowitz, 1999).  
H8a: There is a significant relationship between interest rate and insolvency risk of 
conventional banks in Pakistan. 
The study hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between interest 
rate (INT) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) of the bank. The result indicates that the 
relationship between interest rate (INT) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) is 
insignificant. So, on the basis of result, NULL hypothesis is accepted and alternate 
hypothesis is rejected. According to Issing (2003), central bank of a country has to 
choose between interest rate and inflation rate. So, it can be one of the reasons that 
inflation has significant relationship with insolvency risk but interest rate does not have 
a significant relationship with Z-SCORE in conventional banks of Pakistan. Another 
reason of an insignificant relationship could be the correlation of interest rate and 
inflation. The argument states that if in a country inflation rate is high than asset return 
moves with inflation rate rather than interest rate (Hellwig, 1994). Thus, Pakistan is one 
of the countries with high inflation rate, so it can be a reason that inflation might play 
a major role in banking profitability and stability instead of interest rate. Moreover, as 
highlighted in the previous finding of  Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), if interest tend to 
rise in presence of inflation then inflation is probably influencing the profitability of 
banks, hence it can be a reason for an insignificant relationship between interest rate 
and insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan. Furthermore, the results of this 
study are similar to the findings of previous authors i.e. (Angbazo, 1997; Konishi & 
Yasuda, 2004; Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Fabling & Grimes, 2005). 
H11a1: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between income from 
advances/ financing and insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan. 
The use of CAR in the relationship between income from advances (IATA) and 
insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) does not produce a significant relationship. When CAR is 
low, the relationship was insignificant and beta coefficient was showing a positive 
direction. When CAR is high in the relationship, the direction of beta become negative 
but relationship remains insignificant. The reason could be that CAR may be a 
regulation which is for stability of nonperforming loans because CAR was introduced 
by Basel committee after credit crisis for maintaining cushion against financing. So, 
CAR reduces the impact of NPL of banks and hence due to extra cushion of minimum 
capital requirement may be able to produce stability in income from advances. The 
stability of income from advances reduces the standard deviation of ROA and will result 
in higher Z-SCORE. The higher Z-SCORE indicates a less risky bank.  
In addition, Another reason of insignificant relationship could be that income 
from advances are relatively more stable and do not pose serious threat to insolvency 
risk (Lepetit et al., 2008a). In relation to nonperforming loans CAR helps to reduce 
nonperforming loans and uplift asset quality, which increases income from advances. 
CAR might also help to reduce agency problem and disturbance in portfolio of advances 
income. So, it may be the reason that CAR interact with nonperforming loans and 
provision for nonperforming loans to stabilize income from advances.   
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H11a2: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between income from 
investments and insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan 
 The regression results indicate that when CAR is low the impact of IITA on 
insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) is insignificant and Positive. So, when CAR is low, one 
unit change in IITA will increase the value of Z-SCORE by 0.1326 units reduce 
insolvency risk. When CAR is high the relationship become insignificant and direction 
of relationship remains positive. The reason could be a stable portfolio of investment 
and less earning volatility of investment income of conventional banks. If the portfolio 
of earing is less volatile will increase return on asset (ROA) and standard deviation of 
ROA will be small. Hence, this will increase value of Z-SCORE and can make bank 
more stable. The results of interaction CAR*IITA highlights that CAR does not 
moderate the effect the effect of IITA on Z-SCORE.  
H11a3: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between income from fee, 
commission and brokerage income and insolvency risk in conventional banks of 
Pakistan. 
When CAR is low, the regression results show that FBTA increases insolvency 
risk. One unit change in FBTA will reduce value of Z-SCORE by 0.1343 units and 
increase insolvency risk. When CAR is high, the relationship between FBTA and Z-
SCORE become insignificant. This highlights that CAR does no moderate the 
relationship between FBTA and insolvency risk. In relation to IITA, IITA reduces 
insolvency risk, while FBTA increases insolvency risk, when CAR is low is relative to 
modern portfolio theory. The reason of an insignificant relationship between 
CAR*FBTA and Z-SCORE, could be that FBTA does not require any extra cushion to 
generate income from fee, commission and brokerage. Hence, it places manager’s 
incentive for personal gain.  
H12a1: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between GDP growth and 
insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan.  
The relationship between GDP and insolvency risk in conventional banks of 
Pakistan is positive and significant, one unit increase in GDP increases value of Z-
SCORE by 12.5745 units and reduces insolvency risk, when CAR is low. The 
introduction of CAR in relationship between the GDP and insolvency risk actually 
convert the relationship to insignificant. The reason could be that higher growth of GDP 
increase the debt servicing capacity of bank, the better debt servicing capacity of bank 
will improve asset quality of bank. So, better asset quality may improve bank earning 
and make it easy to keep minimum capital requirement of tier 1 capital. Hence, it can 
be said that GDP growth help banks to improve CAR. Thus it might become the reason 
of an insignificant relationship. The results are inline to some of previous authors (i.e. 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) ,Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras (2011) and Vogiazas and 
Nikolaidou (2011b)) those highlighted that increase in GDP increases the stability of 
bank and reduces insolvency risk. 
H12a3: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between interest rate and 
insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan.  
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The relationship between INT and Z-SCORE in conventional banks of Pakistan 
is insignificant when CAR is low. Even when CAR is high, the relationship still remains 
insignificant. According to Hellwig (1994), there is a correlation between interest rate 
and inflation rate, so in some countries between interest rate or inflation rate one can 
influence the banking system (Issing, 2003). Therefore, it could be one of the reasons 
that inflation has significant positive relationship with insolvency while CAR is low 
and for interest the relationship with insolvency remains insignificant when CAR is 
low. When CAR is high, the relationship of inflation becomes positive and significant 
with Z-SCORE, while interest rate relationship remains insignificant. Another reason 
for this insignificant could be the argument that interest rate increases when inflation 
increases (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009), this defines that interest rate may be dependent 
on inflation.  
H12a4: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between corruption and 
insolvency risk in conventional banks of Pakistan. 
The regression results indicate that increase in corruption (CUR) will increase 
insolvency risk when CAR is low. One unit change in corruption (CUR) will reduce 
value of Z-SCORE by 6.1687 units. But when CAR is high, the relationship becomes 
insignificant and positive. The application of CAR does not reduce the effect of 
corruption and agency problem. According to Aidt (2009) and Swaleheen (2011) 
corruption is an obstacle in development of an economy, which indicates that it will 
increase insolvency risk of institution of an economy. The reason might be that 
corruption erodes the money supply in a system which can produce liquidity risk in an 
economy. The erosion of money from a system can cause higher nonperforming loans, 
and higher nonperforming loans reducing the income of an institution. The continuous 
reduction of money in a system increases debts on consumer. In relation to this 
increment of debts, consumer enables to pay debts than can cause insolvency risk to the 
bank. Furthermore, CAR does not hold cushion against the erosion of money produced 
by CUR. Therefore, CAR might not moderate the relationship between corruption 
(CUR) and Z-SCORE but the relationship between CUR and Z-SCORE becomes 
insignificant and reverse the direction of beta coefficient (negative to positive). 
Furthermore, there is no cushion of CUR in CAR; this can be a reason that CAR could 
not moderate the negative effect of CUR on Z-SCORE. 
H1b: There is a significant relationship between nonperforming loans/ financing to 
gross loans/ financing and insolvency risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The hypothesis is to find the significant relationship between nonperforming 
financing to gross financing. On contrary, the results of multiple regression show that 
there is no significant relationship between nonperforming financing (NPL) to gross 
financing and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) in Islamic banks of Pakistan. 
The insignificant relationship could be due to the small share of Islamic banking 
to overall banking system in Pakistan that is 8.9% (total Islamic banks assets to total 
banking assets of Pakistan) (Hassan, 2016). Moreover, the total contribution of 
financial sector in GDP of Pakistan is 3.25% and 5.5% in years 2015 and 2016 
respectively (Recorder, 2016). Therefore, the smaller ratio of NPL which is 0.07% (see 
Chapter 5 Table 5.2) in Islamic banks may result in a very nominal ratio of NPL to 
GDP. Hence, this ratio may not be able to influence insolvency risk of Islamic banks.   
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The other reason could be that the relationship between nonperforming asset 
and insolvency risk is insignificant could be due to the Islamic mode of financing which 
is profit and loss sharing (PLS). According to  Sundararajan and Errico (2002), Islamic 
banks can transfer credit risk to investment account holders, who do not have the same 
rights like equity holder but share the same risk. The share of profit and loss between a 
borrower and lender increase the capacity of Islamic banking to share losses and bear 
income volatility  (Hasan & Dridi, 2010; Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013).  
Another reason could be that customers in Islamic bank are more risk aversive. 
According to Miller and Hoffmann (1995), Osoba (2003) and Hilary and Hui (2009) 
that the relationship between risk aversion and religious inclination of individual is 
positive. This relationship can influence the performance of the bank’s asset side by 
encouraging borrowers to fulfill the obligation from their side under Islamic loan 
contract. Therefore, the risk aversive behavior and religious inclination of clients due 
to religiosity can help the banks to mitigate its default risk. Furthermore, According to 
Abedifar, Molyneux, and Tarazi (2013), the share of Muslim population in  total 
population also effect the risk of default in Islamic banks. The author argues that if the 
total share of Muslim population in total population large, the Islamic banks are less 
likely to default. In Pakistan, the total share of Muslim population is 95% of total 
population. Thus, this could be the reason that religiosity factor reduces the insolvency 
risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan.  
H2b: There is a significant relationship between provision for nonperforming loans/ 
financing to gross loans/ financing and insolvency risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan 
The study hypothesize that there is a significant relationship between provision 
for nonperforming loans and insolvency risk. The regression results, on contrary 
indicate that there is no significant relationship between provision for nonperforming 
loans (PNPL) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). Islamic principles for lending is based 
on PLS (profit and loans sharing agreement) and use dynamic provisioning for losses. 
This might be a reason for an insignificant relationship. Moreover, Islamic banks are 
encouraged to use profit equalization and investment risk reserves for stable returns for 
investment account holders (Boulila Taktak, Ben Slama Zouari, & Boudriga, 2010). 
Hence, the use of dynamic provisioning and investment risk reserves might be a reason 
that the relationship between PNPL and Z-SCORE is insignificant in Islamic banks of 
Pakistan.  
H3b: There is a significant relationship between income from advances/ financing and 
insolvency risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The study hypothesized that there will be a significant relationship between 
income from advances/ financing (IATA) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) in Islamic 
banks of Pakistan. The regression result shows that there is no significant relationship 
between income from advances/ financing (IATA) and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). 
Hence, the study rejects alternate hypothesis.  There could be multiple reasons behind 
this insignificant relationship. A plausible reason can be that non-PLS mode of 
financing in Islamic banks is not much different from conventional but it is less risky 
as compared to conventional bank due to religious factor (Čihák and Hesse 2008). 
Islamic banks clients are ready to pay rent on financial services in alignment to their 
religious belief (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
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Merrouche, 2013). Moreover, due to moral religious obligation, Islamic banks enjoy 
substantially higher growth rate as compared to conventional banks (Khan, A. K., 
2010). Furthermore, religiosity is not the only factor of growth; the other factor could 
be that Islamic banks are in their infancy phase and more growth focused, hence having 
higher growth rate. So, they are performing better than conventional banks (Obaidullah, 
2005). Hence, it could be the reason that the relationship between IATA and Z-SCORE 
in Islamic bank of Pakistan is insignificant.  
Another reason could be the Islamic sharia that prohibits excessive risk taking. 
According to Obaidullah (2005), in Sharia it is strictly prohibited to take excessive risk 
“Gharar”. Generally, Islamic banks offers reasonable profit rates which is agreed by 
both parties. In such agreements both customers and the bank are aware of the 
obligation. Therefore, it stabilizes the earning of the bank from mitigation of credit risk, 
liquidity risk. Hence, it helps a bank to reduce insolvency risk. Furthermore, one other 
reason could be that in Islamic banks the cost of monitoring and screening is lower as 
compared to conventional banks. This is because of PLS agreement and borrower’s 
status equaling to an equity holder. This actually helps the banks to reduce cost of 
monitoring and screening and it also helps to reduce agency problem between principal 
and agent (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013).  
 H4b: There is a significant relationship between income from investment and 
insolvency risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The relationship between income from investment (IITA) and insolvency risk 
(Z-SCORE) is insignificant which is contrary to the hypothesis suggested in chapter 4. 
One of the reasons could be that Islamic banks have part from PLS and they have other 
financing contract such as Murabaha, Musharkah and Ijarah. The nature of contracts 
and fixed rate of payment allow Islamic banks to have steady cash inflow. This risk 
sharing agreement and fixed rate of payment provides additional protection to Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, due to risk sharing agreement Islamic banks tends to exercise 
smooth sources to generate income, this is because of their larger proportion of asset 
side (Čihák & Hesse, 2008).  
Furthermore, Diamond and Rajan (1999) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) argued 
that the discipline imposed by a depositor to enter in an Islamic PLS relationship  also 
reduces lending defaults.  In addition to previous argument, another reason can be the 
unique nature of various Sharia constraints, that does not allow Islamic banks to take 
extra risk in their earning (Sundararajan & Errico, 2002).  
Additionally, the proportion of Muslim population can be another factor that 
reduces the risk due to religiosity factor (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013). Another 
reason could be like risk sharing element works in both short term and long term 
agreement, because Islamic banks have smaller investment portfolio (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). The concentration on a smaller portfolio increases the 
ability of managers to become master in the field that helps the banks to reduce 
volatility of earning. The less volatile earning reduces the standard deviation of ROA 
and increases value of Z-SCORE, hence stable value of Z-SCORE indicate a less risky 
bank.  
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H5b: There is a significant relationship between fee, commission and brokerage 
income and insolvency risk of Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The hypothesis of the study is that there is a significant relationship between 
fee, commission and brokerage (FBTA) income and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) in 
Islamic banks, but regression results indicate that there is no significant relationship 
between fee, commission and brokerage (FBTA) income and insolvency risk (Z-
SCORE). In accordance to sharia compliance, it is prohibited to pay predetermined 
payment and receipt of the services rendered by the bank. Therefore,  in mode of Islamic 
banks, profit and loss sharing agreements and fee and commission service charges are 
determined when partnership contract is initiated (Čihák and Hesse 2008). Hence, 
payment of fee, commission services against a contract is determined when partnership 
contract is initiated. This might define that fee, commission and brokerage income is 
not based on accrual. It might be on actual realization of income. Therefore, fee and 
commission based income may reduce the volatility of revenue and this reduces the 
standard deviation of income resulting in a small change in the value of Z-SCORE and 
hence could produce an insignificant relationship between FBTA and Z-SCORE. 
Therefore, it could be a reason that partnership contract of Islamic banks with their 
customers are religion based (Obaidullah, 2005; Khan, F., 2010). Therefore, these 
partnership contracts might help to stabilize the earning of the banks and reduces 
volatility or in other words reduces insolvency risk. 
H7b: There is a significant relat1ionship between inflation rate and insolvency risk of 
Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The relationship of inflation (INF) in Islamic banks of Pakistan is found to be 
insignificant with (Z-SCORE). The results of regression revealed the relationship 
against the hypothesis developed by the study.  The results of current study are in line 
with the previous research of Čihák and Hesse (2008), who argues that there is no 
significant relationship between inflation and insolvency risk of Islamic banks. Among 
many researchers i.e. (Hassan & Bashir, 2003; Al-Tamimi & Hussein, 2010; Kpodar & 
Imam, 2010; Srairi, 2010; Chun & Razak, 2015) highlighted that there is no significant 
relationship between inflation and profitability of Islamic banks. In addition, Kpodar 
and Imam (2010) highlighted that increase in inflation reduces the intermediary effect 
of Islamic banks because customer tend to invest more in fixed asset rather than 
financial asset. Therefore, it could be a reason that if inflation reduces the intermediary 
effect of Islamic bank then they may be unable to affect the earning of the bank. 
Furthermore, it will result in smooth earning for the bank and there will be no volatility 
in earning due to rise in inflation and will not affect Z-SCORE or in other words 
insolvency risk. Hence, it could be a reason that there is no significant relationship 
between inflation and insolvency risk in Islamic banks of Pakistan.  
H8b: There is a significant relationship between profit rate and insolvency risk of 
Islamic banks in Pakistan. 
The regression results of relationship between interest rate (INT) and insolvency 
risk (Z-SCORE), indicates that the relationship is insignificant. While, the study 
hypothesized that there is a significant relationship between interest rate (INF) and 
insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). The reason of insignificant relationship might be the 
prohibition of interest (Riba). Islamic banks have to follow the rule of Sharia. The 
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Sharia explains that predetermined rate of profit or fixed payment is exploitation and 
inconsistent with fairness of contract (Hassan & Bashir, 2003; Kpodar & Imam, 2010). 
According to Čihák and Hesse (2008), the determination of rent, clearance service fee 
and other income is determined at the time of initiation of partnership contract. So, it 
highlights that there might be less revision of rental or other agreed income. Therefore, 
less revision in agreed contract may not affect the volatility of profitability of banks. 
Hence, it could be another reason that INF has an insignificance relationship with Z-
SCORE.  
H12b1: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between macroeconomic 
factor GDP growth and insolvency risk in Islamic banks of Pakistan. 
The relationship between GDP and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) is significant 
when CAR is low. But when CAR is high, the relationship between GDP and 
insolvency risk (Z-SCORE) becomes insignificant but the direction of relationship 
becomes positive. Therefore, an insignificant relation between CAR*GDP indicates 
that CAR does not moderate the relationship between GDP and Z-SCORE. In fact, CAR 
is a regulation imposed by State bank of Pakistan, so it can be said that CAR is a type 
of governance mechanism for banks. However, the use of CAR does not regulate the 
effect of GDP; this means that CAR may not have capacity to moderate the effect of 
GDP growth in Islamic banks of Pakistan. Another plausible reason can be that Pakistan 
is one among the countries of the world, which is suffering higher volatility in GDP 
growth (see Chapter 1, Table 1.6). The sharp increase and decrease in GDP growth is 
due to many factors, for example, law and order, political instability, bad governance 
and hike of corruption. So, these can become reasons for an insignificant relationship 
between CAR*GDP and Z-SCORE. 
H12b2: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between inflation rate and 
insolvency risk in Islamic banks of Pakistan 
The relationship between INF and Z-SCORE is in significant, either when CAR 
is low or CAR is high. It can be seen in Table 6.11that there is no affect of capital 
regulation on inflation. According to Kpodar and Imam (2010), in certain situations 
central banks of many countries are assigned to perform credit allocation to favored 
sectors of economy to rise up economic development, instead of keeping a check on 
inflation. Moreover, increase in inflation reduces the intermediary effect of Islamic 
banks and customer. In this situation customers starts to switch their investment from 
financial assets to fixed asset (Kpodar & Imam, 2010). Therefore, this phenomenon 
might highlight that the compliance of regulation may become weak and banking 
system remains underdeveloped. Thus, this could be the reasons that CAR is unable to 
moderate the relationship between INF and Z-SCORE. 
H12b3: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between interest rate and 
insolvency risk in Islamic banks of Pakistan.  
The use of CAR does not moderate the relationship between interest rate (INT) 
and insolvency risk (Z-SCORE). The regression results of direct relationship between 
INT and Z-SCORE is insignificant. According to Chong and Liu (2009), Khan, F. 
(2010) and Kpodar and Imam (2010), the money does not produce money surplus itself 
as explained by Sharia principle. Therefore, interest (Riba) is prohibited in Islamic 
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banks. Furthermore, CAR is a governance indicator of banks devised in accordance to 
the guidelines of BASEL committee to regulate bank risk. Therefore, State bank of 
Pakistan devised CAR on the similar guideline of BASEL committee for conventional 
banks. SBP also directed Islamic banks to maintain the same CAR of conventional 
banks. So, CAR may not be designed to moderate the impact of interest on insolvency 
in Islamic bank. Thus, this could be a reason that CAR does not moderate the 
relationship between INF and Z-SCORE. Furthermore, Čihák and Hesse (2008) 
highlighted that profit rate, rent rate are defined at the initiation of contract. Therefore, 
interest rate does not play part in earing of Islamic banks. Hence, it could be another 
reason that CAR does not moderate the relationship between INF and Z-SCORE.  
H12b4: Capital adequacy ratio moderates the relationship between corruption index 
and insolvency risk in Islamic banks of Pakistan 
The relationship between CUR and Z-SCORE is significant and positive, when 
CAR is low. When CAR is high, the relationship becomes insignificant but direction 
remains positive. This indicates that CAR could not moderate the impact of corruption 
on insolvency risk. As explained by Houston (2007), when law implementation in a 
system is weak then corruption can play a significant role in development of an 
institutions. But on contrary to the previous argument, Houston (2007) also highlighted 
that increase in corruption has adverse effect on economy, which can result in bad 
development of an institution. Moreover, CAR is a form of regulation for stability of 
bank, but it does not require bank to hold minimum capital requirement against 
corruption. Hence, this could be another reason that increase in CAR as a governance 
mechanism of banks may not reduce the impact of corruption in Islamic bank of 
Pakistan.  
